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As was clear and even desirable, the NATO Washington Summit ended with strong stances in support of Ukraine and against Russian aggression initiated on 24 February 2022. However, the 75th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance also played a delicate role, that of seeing Europe and the Allies return to an atmosphere very similar to that of the Cold War. Between rearmament and the risk of escalation, the position taken by Russia contrary to international law and the various open crises on the global scene that threaten to undermine the stability of the Alliance, the spirit of the summit could only be one of resolve.
SUPPORT FOR KIEV
The reflection on NATO countries’ support for Kiev starts from what the Secretary General of the Alliance has said. Jens Stoltenberg’s words concern the much debated issue of Kiev’s membership in NATO. The Secretary defined this path as an “irreversible path”, a position that has already been defined in the past and that has provoked Moscow’s reaction on several occasions. The Kremlin in fact, also on the sidelines of this summit, called NATO forces already part of the conflict in Ukraine due to military support to Kiev and economic sanctions. Also central to the debate was the allocation of funds and armaments to be sent to Zelensky. In particular, the decision to allocate forty billion dollars and the supply of air defence systems. These included American-made Patriots, as well as ammunition for Himars and for artillery already present in the theatre of conflict. The debate also involved the supply of a patrol of F-16s useful, according to the US administration, to contain (if not repel) the Russian advance. Then there is the pact signed in Washington between Germany, France, Italy and Poland for the development of a long-range defensive weapon. In this case, we are talking about a missile that would be capable of reaching targets a thousand kilometres away, which would be useful as a defensive umbrella with a view to deterrence. Finally, another issue that saw extensive debate was the formation of a battalion of Polish volunteers that could be trained and equipped directly by the Warsaw Armed Forces and sent to fight alongside the Ukrainians.
THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE
Support for Kiev cannot but pass through the defence of Europe. Indeed, there is the announcement by the United States of the forthcoming deployment of new long-range weapons on German territory. This is a move that still falls within the doctrine of deterrence proposed by NATO, but which aims to defuse possible expansionist aims of Moscow in the direction of the Alliance countries. Actions that jeopardise the territorial integrity of a member could in fact trigger an immediate reaction, which is difficult to control from the perspective of escalation and the new Russian doctrine, which is increasingly open to the use of tactical nuclear warheads. The deployment of the Multi Domain Task Force in Germany is expected to start in 2026 and, once the deployment is completed, in addition to SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, it should also contain hypersonic weapons that are currently still being developed by US companies. The considerable increase in range capacity has, as already explained, a deterrent factor against possible expansionist aims on the part of Putin. So if on the one hand NATO aims to help and supply Ukraine with war material to counter Moscow’s advance, on the other hand with the deployment of the Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany starting in 2026, it aims to send a clear signal to the Kremlin that it is impossible to continue on the path taken in 2022 towards the eastern borders of the Atlantic Alliance.
THE SOUTHERN FLANK GAME
Although the Alliance’s attention is focused on the East and the Ukrainian front, a look at the Southern flank was not absent from the Washington summit. In fact, the Southern Flank issue was elevated to a priority by the member states. The critical issues affecting the southernmost countries of the alliance, such as Italy, have several layers and connections with other theatres of crisis, which cannot be forgotten. First of all, there is the pressure from the South due to the migratory issue recalled by several allies. A security issue mainly connected to the problem of trafficking and the penetration of criminal networks, as well as the stability of the economy and governments of the countries most involved in migratory phenomena. Italy is already working hard on this, both bilaterally and within the perimeter of the agreements and instruments provided by the European Union. Of course, taking charge of the problem also at the NATO level could represent an additional step towards protecting the Mediterranean Sea, which is increasingly becoming part of the chessboard and of international geopolitical aims. The Alliance’s border in fact, even to the south, is in close contact with Russian penetration in the Middle East (with Syria) and in Africa. On the African continent, in fact, the presence of Wagner is highly developed in several regions, with Russian mercenaries present in Libya, Mali, and Sudan. On this juncture too, Italy has asked for greater attention, so much so that the Washington summit resulted in the creation of the figure of the Special Envoy for NATO’s Southern Front, with the task of acting as promoter of any initiative aimed at ensuring the security of the Alliance’s southern border. At this juncture, Italy asked to take on this role with one of its representatives, well aware that this could, in the future, lead to the assumption of greater responsibilities, also in terms of the deployment of joint forces on its territory.
THE DEFENCE OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK
This is a possibility that has not been expressed directly, but only hinted at in the national and international press. Of course, a deployment of NATO forces also on the Southern Flank would invoke a strategic principle that is as fundamental as it is elementary, i.e. the division of forces in the field. Moreover, Italy’s geographical position makes the Alliance’s projection more likely in areas such as the Balkans or the aforementioned African continent. This is not a new issue, since Italy had already seen the positioning of Alliance missiles on its territory during the Cold War. Then, with the death of the three Soviet leaders that preceded Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival in the Kremlin (Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko), the Russian leader and American President Ronald Regan, after a series of summits, arrived at the signing of the Inf (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty in 1987. This will lead to the withdrawal and dismantling of medium-range missiles.
THE LESSON OF COMISO
The missiles in Italy came as a result of NATO’s decision to respond to the installation (starting in 1976) of mobile batteries of medium-range nuclear missiles capable of reaching Western Europe. The so-called ‘Euro-missiles’ installed in Italy in 1980 inside the US base at Comiso in Sicily, in the province of Ragusa, created not a few problems for the then Cossiga government, which had to face internal difficulties within its majority for approval, as well as a vast movement against the operation. The analysis of the situation at the time did not yet have the elements to foresee the signing of the Inf treaty, which would have helped detente in the following years. More or less the same scenario in which the Alliance currently finds itself, after the abandonment of the Inf in 2018 by President Trump with the accusation addressed to Russia of having violated the agreements contained in the text (an accusation that is not new and was already made four years earlier by his predecessor Barak Obama). Should in the future the installation of the Multi Domain Task Force not only concern German territory but also extend to Italy, certainly this analysis and the contingency that brings us today much closer to the Cold War scenario and the lesson offered by the Comiso affair cannot be disregarded.