Subscribe
The ECR Party, in collaboration with a company called Forte Forum SIA, has published an extensive opinion poll in two Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania, which aims to analyse the influence and impact of Russian propaganda in general and in particular with regard to defence issues, the war in Ukraine, the position of the West, especially NATO, as well as elements determining national security and defence, such as the level of militarisation and commitment to war among the population.
The use of propaganda and what we know today as disinformation has always been part of the elements used to weaken the enemy and strengthen the mood of the population itself in armed conflicts, although its use has been increasing with the appearance of the media.
Thus, the first manifestations of mass war or strategic propaganda actually occurred with the appearance of the printing press, which allowed the rapid and effective dissemination of messages and speeches. For example, the dissemination in the Netherlands, England and France of the Black Legend against Spain regarding the discovery, conquest and evangelisation of America were very effective instruments to damage the image of the Hispanic monarchy on the European continent during the so-called wars of religion promoted by Lutheranism.
It was undoubtedly in the 20th century that the appearance of radio was a further step forward, as radio – unlike the printing press – allowed a greater number of people to be reached and, above all, a more immediate and effective reaction. Spain was possibly the testing ground for these first manifestations of propaganda. The use of the radio in Seville by Queipo de Llano or by General Mola in Burgos as a means of defusing the messages disseminated from the central power of the Republic in the first days of July 1936 were very effective in consolidating the so-called ‘Alzamiento’ and in recruiting volunteers.
In the Second World War, Goebbels in Germany and Churchill in the United Kingdom undoubtedly saw radio as a very effective tool for attacking the enemy and for strengthening the fighting spirit of the soldiers themselves and of the civilian population. Later, television in modern wars from Vietnamonwards, and finally, the internet and social networks, have made propaganda an essential instrument in any military strategy to the point that military doctrine in Russia, the United States and throughout the world has coined concepts such as hybrid warfare or the grey zone, modifying modern military doctrine.
This is why this report is so important, and if I may, I will comment on the conclusions of both reports in two or three articles – as the results cannot be extrapolated to either country.
The first point is to note, as the authors say, with regard to Estonia, that ‘although almost a quarter of Estonia’s population identifies itself as ethnic Russian’ and most Estonians know and master the Russian language, Putin’s propaganda has not, at least for now, achieved its objectives. In fact, it might even be understood to have had the opposite effect.
Thus, for example, the study notes that there has been a substantial increase in resistance to a foreign invasion, with 73 per cent of the adult population supporting the idea; a much higher percentage than might be found in European states where the immediacy of conflict is not experienced in the same way, particularly in Western countries such as Spain, Italy, France and Belgium.
Even so, it is obvious that the anti-militarism and gentrification typical of post-modern capitalist societies is having an effect on the population, as only 42% of the population say they are willing to fight for Estonia in an armed manner.
The authors of the report link this poor willingness to the confidence in a supportive military response from other NATO countries, as they found that anti-NATO propaganda from Moscow has had no effect, and almost two-thirds of the Estonian population trust NATO’s response in the event of a Russian invasion. I do not doubt the report’s conclusions on this point but I think it cannot be denied that Estonia has already been inoculated with the woke virus of radical individualism and the anti-militarist conception that has taken root in Western Europe.
While Russian propaganda has not fully taken root, it is a fact that just over 20% of Estonians accept that Ukraine is an anti-Russian project supported by the West to destabilise Russia.
I disagree with the report, and its methodology, in considering as an element of Russian propaganda the dissemination of the idea that Europe is in a state of moral decay. One third of Estonians support this idea; but I must say that I myself, and millions of Europeans, support this idea, and I – and those millions of Europeans – cannot be accused of being pro-Russian. The spread of abortion and euthanasia, the explosion of fals
e gender theories from universities, the high level of absenteeism from work, the growing lack of solidarity or the slow response to the planned Islamisation of Europe are indications of an indisputable moral decline.
It is very relevant to see how the demoscopic study itself is based on the logical and rational assumption that the greater consumption of the media clearly determines the propensity to accept or reject the most elementary discourses of so-called Russian propaganda. In both directions, those who consume Western mainstream media are more likely not to be influenced by propaganda, as shown by the growing conviction about NATO’s military support.
Interestingly, socio-demographic factors, according to the Estonian study, are not decisive, which is consistent with the idea that the internet, social networks, radio and television are information and communication media used by almost the entire population, with no substantial differences depending on income or education level.
The report concludes that it does influence personal experience and the attitude or ideological propensity to accept the messages propagated by the Kremlin. For example, the experience of having lived under Soviet influence does determine present convictions and future expectations. In conclusion, a very good report which, perhaps thousands of kilometres away in Rome or Madrid, does not have the same consequences.
And this seems not only reasonable, but almost necessary, because the human being is a historical being, where the past is irrevocable.
The report does not analyse whether its conclusions or results differ according to the age or sex of those consulted; possibly – I am not an expert – because they are not relevant; although, rationally, it can be deduced that one or the other will be relevant. First, young men did not know the criminal Soviet regime; second, women have a natural tendency to avoid conflict and a more conservative outlook on life due to their motherhood; third, and contrary to the previous premise, in a war, men are the first and foremost to be called up and therefore the ones who receive the honours and the bullets; which of course has to have consequences for the conclusions.
It seems logical that the combinations of age and sex are decisive. This is the case in Western countries where conservative or patriotic political options receive more support among young people and men. This is the only thing I miss because the report is of high quality and clear in its conclusions.