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Russian propaganda has posed a significant challenge for Eastern Europe, particularly for countries like Estonia and Lithuania, which share a Soviet past and face ongoing pressure from Russia. Moscow’s strategy employs both military and non-military tools, including disinformation campaigns, to destabilize European democracies and extend its influence. This report, based on representative surveys conducted in 2024, analyzes the impact of Russian propaganda in these two Baltic countries and provides a critical review of the main findings.
Interest in propaganda, especially in Europe, has risen dramatically since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. The Kremlin launched a wide-ranging disinformation campaign to accompany its military actions, aiming to weaken opposition to its aggression. Russia sought to influence public opinion in the Baltic states by promoting anti-Western narratives, questioning the legitimacy of NATO, and attempting to erode trust in democratic institutions. Estonia and Lithuania, both former Soviet republics, have become primary targets of these operations due to their large Russian-speaking minorities and their historical ties to Moscow.
The vulnerability of these nations is partly rooted in their Soviet past and partly in the linguistic and cultural connections shared by Russian-speaking populations. Russian media has been a vehicle for spreading disinformation, amplifying messages that promote distrust in NATO and the European Union. However, while some segments of society have been influenced, the overall resistance to these efforts remains strong, as this study demonstrates.
The study is based on online surveys conducted among adults in Estonia and Lithuania. The surveys gathered responses from 1202 participants in Estonia and 1500 in Lithuania, providing a representative sample of the population aged 18 to 74 in both countries. Respondents were asked about their media consumption habits and their views on various statements, many of which mirrored key messages from Russian propaganda. In addition, the survey included questions about respondents’ socio-economic background, including age, education, ethnicity, and income.
The data were analyzed using linear regression models to determine statistically significant relationships between variables, such as media consumption patterns, political attitudes, and the receptiveness to propaganda. The goal was to identify which factors make individuals more likely to support Russian propaganda narratives and to assess the overall impact of these messages in both Estonia and Lithuania.
Media consumption in Estonia and Lithuania
One of the study’s key findings is that in both Estonia and Lithuania, internet portals in the national languages have become the dominant source of information. Social media and television broadcasts also play important roles, but traditional media consumption, such as newspapers, is significantly lower. The language spoken at home is a critical factor influencing media consumption: those who speak Russian at home are more likely to consume Russian-language media, while those who speak Estonian or Lithuanian at home rely primarily on national media.
In Estonia, about 21% of residents read print media in Estonian daily, compared to only 4% who read Russian-language newspapers. Television remains a popular medium, with around 44% of the population watching Estonian-language TV daily, while only 6% watch the Russian-language public broadcaster ETV+ and 5% watch Russian TV channels. Radio follows a similar trend, with 40% listening to Estonian-language broadcasts and only 6% tuning into Russian-language radio.
Lithuania exhibits similar patterns: 25% of Lithuanians read newspapers in Lithuanian daily, while only 1% read Russian-language print media. Television is more popular in Lithuania, with 55% watching Lithuanian-language broadcasts every day, compared to only 2% who watch Russian TV channels. Radio consumption follows suit, with 44% of Lithuanians listening to Lithuanian radio daily, and only 1% listening to Russian radio.
These figures demonstrate that Russian-language media have limited reach, despite the significant Russian-speaking populations in both countries. This suggests that, while Russian propaganda does target these audiences, its overall impact is constrained by the relatively small number of people regularly consuming Russian media.
Resistance to russian propaganda
Despite Russia’s sustained efforts to influence public opinion in Estonia and Lithuania, both nations display strong resistance to the messages promoted by Moscow. A key aspect of Russian propaganda is the suggestion that small nations like Estonia and Lithuania are powerless to resist an invasion by a larger power like Russia. However, the majority of respondents in both countries reject this narrative.
In Estonia, 48% of the population firmly believes that it makes sense to resist a foreign invasion, with another 25% leaning toward this view. However, when asked if they would be willing to fight for their country, only 19% expressed a firm willingness, with 24% somewhat agreeing. This suggests that while there is broad support for the idea of resisting an invasion, the actual willingness to engage in armed conflict is lower. This discrepancy may be explained by Estonia’s reliance on NATO for its defense, as 44% of respondents believe that NATO’s military presence improves Estonia’s security.
In Lithuania, 37% of respondents firmly believe that resistance to an invasion makes sense, and 26% are inclined to agree. However, as in Estonia, fewer people are willing to fight: only 15% say they are prepared to take up arms for Lithuania. Despite this, confidence in NATO remains strong, with 44% of Lithuanians believing that NATO’s military presence enhances their country’s security. Only 7% believe that NATO would not defend Lithuania in the event of a Russian invasion.
These results highlight a key trend: while the populations of both Estonia and Lithuania are aware of the Russian threat, they place their trust in NATO rather than in their own ability to resist militarily. Russian propaganda, which seeks to undermine this trust in NATO, has had limited success, especially in Lithuania, where support for the alliance remains robust.
Russian propaganda and social values
Another important theme in Russian propaganda is the portrayal of the West as morally corrupt and in decline. This message has found some resonance among certain segments of the population in both Estonia and Lithuania. In Estonia, 13% of respondents fully agree that Europe is in moral decay, while 24% tend to agree. In Lithuania, 12% fully agree, with another 27% expressing partial agreement.
However, more extreme narratives, such as the claim that Ukraine is an “anti-Russian project” backed by the West to destabilize Russia, have gained little traction. In Estonia, only 8% fully agree with this statement, while in Lithuania, the figure is 7%. This suggests that while some elements of Russian propaganda, particularly those related to social and cultural issues, resonate with certain groups, the broader population remains skeptical of Moscow’s more aggressive claims, especially regarding Ukraine.
The idea of a resurgence of fascism, another theme frequently used by Russian propaganda to criticize its neighbors, has also had limited impact. In Estonia, only 6% of respondents fully agree that fascism is on the rise, with another 11% tending to agree. In Lithuania, these figures are even lower, at 3% and 4%, respectively. This indicates that the population largely rejects this accusation, despite its frequent use in Russian media.
Socio-Demographic and political factors in the reception of propaganda
The study also explored how socio-demographic factors influence the reception of Russian propaganda. In Estonia, older individuals and those with lower incomes are more likely to be receptive to Russian messages, particularly those who consume Russian-language media. However, socio-demographic factors play a smaller role in Lithuania, where media consumption patterns are a stronger predictor of susceptibility to propaganda.
Political attitudes are among the most significant factors affecting receptiveness to propaganda in both countries. Confidence in the national armed forces, perceptions of how ethnic minorities are treated, and views on life under Soviet rule all play crucial roles. In Estonia, those who believe that ethnic minorities are treated fairly and that the country’s military is strong are less likely to support Russian narratives. Similarly, in Lithuania, those who have positive views of the government’s performance and who trust the military are less likely to be influenced by Russian propaganda.
Those who view the Soviet era favorably, on the other hand, are more likely to be sympathetic to Russian messages. In both Estonia and Lithuania, there is a clear correlation between nostalgia for the Soviet past and susceptibility to propaganda. This highlights the importance of historical memory in shaping contemporary political attitudes and suggests that efforts to promote a more accurate understanding of Soviet history could help reduce the impact of Russian disinformation.
In conclusion, the study demonstrates that Russian propaganda has had limited success in Estonia and Lithuania, despite Moscow’s efforts to undermine trust in NATO and promote its influence. While some segments of the population, particularly those who consume Russian-language media and those with favorable views of the Soviet past, are more susceptible to propaganda, these groups represent a minority.
The majority of people in both countries continue to reject Russian narratives, particularly those related to the moral decay of the West and the legitimacy of NATO. Trust in the alliance remains strong, and both Estonians and Lithuanians place their faith in NATO’s ability to defend them against Russian aggression.
The fight against Russian propaganda is far from over, but the results of this study suggest that Estonia and Lithuania are well-prepared to face this challenge. With strong national identities and a commitment to their Western allies, these countries remain resilient in the face of disinformation and continue to resist Moscow’s attempts to destabilize their societies.