Subscribe
On September 8th Members of the European Parliament discussed with the Commission the issue of border controls. In particular, at the centre of the debate – which, as the procedure requires, did not result in a resolution – was the analysis of the implications related to the future of the Schengen area in the face of the reintroduction of internal border controls by several EU member states.
THE CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE
There are currently 12 member states that have introduced some form of internal border control despite being part of the Schengen area. Not a small number if we think that, in total, the Schengen free trade area includes 29 countries: 25 EU Member States (all except Cyprus and Ireland) plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Italy, for example, is among the EU member states that have reintroduced some forms of control. In this case, the controls started on 19 June this year (with a formal termination date of 18 December 2024) and concern the border with Slovenia. The reasons for this decision relate to the risk of terrorist activities linked to the turmoil in the Middle East and the possible risk of infiltration of irregular migration flows. Moreover, another issue that led the Italian government to restart controls on this border concerns the risk of violence linked to the continuation of the war in Ukraine and the current Italian presidency of the G7. Germany itself announced on September 9th, through the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, the reintroduction of border controls on all those borders that did not yet have them. In fact, Germany already had border controls in place with France, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and Switzerland. The reasons mainly concerned the increase in irregular migration and migrant smuggling, also in connection with the poor living conditions in the countries of origin. There is also the focus on the conflict in Ukraine, as well as critical issues related to international terrorism and the situation in the Middle East. The German move to extend controls has certainly not gone unnoticed, especially since it is linked to limiting irregular immigration into the country and to control and increase internal security. An initiative that, due to Germany’s central role and geographical location, has raised several concerns, especially in relation to the future of the Schengen free trade area.
THE PROCEDURE FOR THE REINTRODUCTION OF CONTROL
Of course, the decision to reintroduce the control of internal borders (or part of them) has a legal background common to the member states of the European Union and in particular of the Schengen free trade area. The procedure is contained in the Schengen Borders Code (SBC), which offers member states precisely the procedure to initiate the temporary reintroduction of internal border control, always in the face of a serious threat to public order or internal security. In any case, this would be a procedure that must be maintained as a last resort and should in any case follow and respect the common principle of proportionality with the threat. Moreover, the reintroduction of control must have very precise limits linked to the legal basis that made its introduction necessary. In the case of Italy, for example, border control with Slovenia is due to end – assuming the risk is not prolonged – on 18 December. This measure is one of the issues where the Commission, and therefore the European institutions, have no other say than to issue an opinion. It is in fact the prerogative of the individual member states of the Schengen free trade area to decide whether to reintroduce controls at an internal border within the area. The Commission, for its part, cannot issue a veto, but only an opinion on the real need for this measure and the degree of proportionality in relation to the risks and threats.
CONTROL AND INTERNAL SECURITY
The interest of member states in the protection and development of the Schengen free trade area is undeniable. It is an achievement of the European Union that cannot be underestimated and, indeed, should be further strengthened. But this is without forgetting the prerogatives and just expectations of the EU member states, increasingly interested in maintaining a wide margin of national sovereignty on certain issues. Among these, there is certainly the increasingly generalised desire among European chancelleries to implement more stringent and effective measures for a more capillary control of the various immigration channels. This need is all the more pressing if the state in question is on the border of the Schengen free trade area, and therefore increasingly subject to migration routes and illegal immigration flows. Migratory pressure and human trafficking also undoubtedly have internal social consequences within individual member states that can lead, over time, to the development of critical issues and deep problems on the internal security front. Think, for example, of the influence of international organised crime, as well as drugs and human trafficking to feed the prostitution circuit. These are all elements against which the member states of the European Union are increasingly manifesting their desire to increase profiles of autonomy and national sovereignty. Not to mention the risks of collusion between the flows of the illegal immigration system and the growing intermingling of organised crime and international terrorism. Internal security, therefore, also passes through internal border controls (without forgetting those outside the European Union, which we will discuss shortly) that over time are also configured as tools for protecting and preserving the most basic historical, cultural and civil values of the European Union’s member states.
FROM CONTROLLING INTERNAL BORDERS TO DEFENDING EXTERNAL ONES
The issue of borders and their protection must go through a useful – and perhaps now urgent – process of redefining priorities, first by the member states and then by the institutions of the European Union. The control of internal borders, even in the face of the procedure dictated by the Schengen area agreements, represents a limited instrument in the hands of governments. The priority is to be reviewed so that it can be moved from efforts to control the internal borders of the Schengen free trade area to the defence of the European Union’s external borders, with a closer look at all those countries (particularly in the Mediterranean area) that act as a real border and shield against the phenomenon of illegal immigration in all its facets. Therefore, moving from primarily monitoring movements within the European Union to primarily controlling access to the Union area, focusing on the instruments in the hands of border states. An important basis in this process of shifting perspective and priority can be found in the data of the Frontex operation, which, for example, certify that the strategy deployed by the Italian government is absolutely effective. The concentration of energies on an external dimension of the phenomenon, aiming above all to block the departures of irregular migrants, even before controlling and certifying their access within the Union, represents precisely that change of perspective that can make a difference at the level of migration policies. An action that is rational and based on data, not on ideologies that block what could be an effective external action of policies that originate on European soil. A cooperation that is truly equal with the countries of departure or transit of migrants, an element that in cases such as the Mattei Plan represents the real core of what should become the European logic and capacity to affect the phenomenon of illegal migration, creating, in the places of origin of migrants, their opportunities and the minimum conditions necessary to decide not to migrate.