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In all likelihood, when it comes to the revolution we are currently experiencing, we are not yet in a position to be able to define and analyse new paradigms of international relations. Although the context in which we live has undergone – and continues to undergo on a daily basis – substantial changes in the system of relations between states and between major powers, the definition of a new standard of dialogue is probably still far from being expressible. Such an analysis, made at the current juncture, would still suffer from many missing elements and data. First of all, the role that the United States and the European Union will play in the resolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As well as certainly the weight that the trade policy dictated by President Donald Trump may have on international markets. On the European continent, in the chancelleries and among the institutions of the European Union, we will then have to consider the weight that realignment policies, first and foremost the ReArm Europe programme, will have in the near future. Therefore, even if the time is not yet ripe for a detailed analysis that can outline new patterns of interpretation and investigation, we can, however, begin to put together all the elements that will build this analysis in the future. Especially if we aim to assess these scenarios from a conservative perspective and with the idea of an increasing weight of conservative forces within the European institutions and in the governments of the member states.
THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE AND THE LOGIC OF RUPTURE
In the conflict that began with the invasion of Ukraine by Moscow’s troops, the main actors at the moment – apart from the government and the Ukrainian people who continue to fight despite the changed and shifting international scenario – are certainly Trump’s United States, Putin’s Russia and the European Union on the eve of a rearmament process that now seems almost inevitable. These are the points of view that cannot be overlooked in a future analysis, especially since the moves of the two superpowers and the member states of the European Union could become the basis for interpreting the next international crises. The aggressive stance taken by the Kremlin – in the past with Crimea, with the Donbass and from 2022 with the invasion of Ukrainian territory – cannot be overlooked. Especially if one looks at what could be placed on a possible negotiating table, be it in Riyadh or elsewhere. Certainly for Moscow, at the moment, the immediate end of the conflict is not a priority. Putin’s hope is surely to be able to sit down and negotiate with Kiev or Trump from a stronger position. Even one more kilometre of occupied territory, in the Kremlin’s logic, carries weight both in terms of the conflict and internationally, not to mention the resonance Putin hopes to achieve at home. Then there is the chapter of sanctions imposed on Russia in recent years that will surely become a topic of debate. Suffice it to say that Trump himself in recent days has returned to evoking them, speaking of indirect duties on Russian oil if Putin does not respect American mediation. The tycoon’s gaze, therefore, is certainly pointed in Moscow’s direction, although in the economic logic embodied by this new presidency, the importance of China cannot be underestimated. The duties that will be imposed in the coming days, and which will surely have a response from the world’s major economies, are still very difficult to analyse. Reciprocity, which has been questioned and could be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, will also be a key factor in assessing relations with the United States in the near future. More favoured countries might suffer less from President Trump’s tariffs, while a ‘diplomatic discourtesy’ might weigh on the wallet of a state and its citizens. In this scenario, the response of the markets and the response of the European Union, for example, will play a part in the forthcoming analysis of the balances and crises in the international landscape in the coming months.
The responses of the European Union and its member states to these changed scenarios are certainly among the most interesting elements at the moment. The cooling of the US momentum towards European security is the first of the problems faced by EU members, at least from the point of view of security doctrine. One instrument to cope with this contingency is certainly the ReArm Europe plan, which aims to a progressive strengthening of an industrial base (again with a view to defence, but not only) with investments, development and purchases that can be jointly made by the member countries: the basis of a strategic convergence that is also linked to the composition of the different military doctrines of the European armies. Not all chancelleries, however, take the same attitude towards this interest, just as not all governments are ready to promote the possibility of direct intervention on Ukrainian soil. Italy itself has repeatedly stated that any mission must be sewn up within a higher international mandate.
REARM EUROPE: THE DEBATE IN EUROPEAN CHANCELLERIES
Of course, the considerations presented so far must necessarily take into account the internal situation in the individual member States of the EU. The internal debate has always been the one most widely perceived and understood by the public, just as it is precisely the internal news that is the most covered by the mainstream media. Despite this, in recent weeks the debate on the ReArm Europe programme presented by European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen could not be overlooked, also on the internal front of the individual member States. An issue that at national level has divided majorities and oppositions, as well as opened up divergences even within the government coalitions themselves. One of the cases that can be taken as an example is that of the Italian government, where different positions have gradually crystallised among the components of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s coalition. But the Brussels defence and funding plan has created much disagreement in many of the European chancelleries. In the Netherlands, for example, the situation reached the point where the Amsterdam parliament voted against Von Der Leyen’s project. With two votes to spare, the parliamentarians forced Prime Minister Dick Schoof (in favour of the Brussels guidelines) to block the Netherlands’ participation. This vote was also supported by the government coalition parties, all except the Liberals, who were in favour of Von Der Leyen’s ideas. The basic concept was that defence spending should not become a joint matter with other member States, but resources should instead remain to be handled at a strictly national level. Even for Spain, with Pedro Sánchez’s government, there has been talk of a split on the subject of ReArm Europe between the Socialist Party, ready to subscribe to the Brussels guidelines, and the left-wing Sumar coalition, much more sceptical. In fact, both Podemos and Izquierda Unida have expressed their contrary positions, also supported by parties linked to the Catalan and Galician regions. Then there is the case of France, where Prime Minister Macron openly supports the need to increase investment in defence, while the opposition parties have taken a much more dubious front on what to do. In the centre of Europe, public opinion and parties have shown rather favourable positions towards the policies put on the table by Brussels. Exceptions in this respect are Hungary and Slovakia, but if we look at Germany, we can see that the parliamentary debate gave the go-ahead (by a large majority) to the amendment of the constitution that would allow the creation of debt to invest in infrastructure and military spending. A vote on which there were no surprises from the parties of the coalition supporting the government. Certainly, in conclusion, it is on this juncture that the future of the European Union is at stake, especially in terms of its development and progressive loosening.